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The realization of the Walrasian program has, apart from mathematical feats, not
been a success story (Ackerman and Nadal, 2004). The program cannot be aban-
doned, though, as long as no promising alternative is on the horizon. It is a bit like
Waiting for Godot.
There is another alternative: to formulate a completely new research
program and conceptual approach. As we have seen, this is often
spoken of, but there is still no indication of what it might mean. (Ingrao
and Israel, 1990, p. 362)
Formal rigor is certainly a strong point of the Walrasian program. Heterodox critics
either overlook or ignore that to start from axioms is a logical imperative for any
theoretical approach. Thus far Debreu was right. But to start from behavioral
axioms means to start with the wrong foot.
The great contradiction revealed is as follows: one of the theories
greatest strength – its claim to deduce significant results from very
general hypotheses about the behavior of economic agents – turns out
to be its greatest weakness. (Ingrao and Israel, 1990, p. 364)
It has been argued elsewhere that subjective-behavioral thinking has to be replaced
by something fundamentally different (2013a). Conceptual rigor demands, first, to
take objective-structural axioms as a formal point of departure and, secondly, to
clarify the interrelations of the fundamental concepts income and profit. Concep-
tual consistency deserves as much attention as formal consistency. An axiomatic
approach that has no real world interpretation is of no use in theoretical economics.
The present paper reconstructs the characteristic properties of a Walrasian economy
in structural axiomatic terms, generalizes them and explores the consequences for
our understanding of the working of the economy we happen to live in.
We start from the objective givens of the monetary economy. Section 1 provides
the formal point of departure with the set of three structural axioms. In Section 2
the competitive structure is derived from the conditions of market clearing, budget
balancing, zero profit and the proportionality of expenditures and labor input. It
turns out as the most elementary law of value that the exchange ratio is inverse to
the transformation ratio. In Section 3 preferences, productivity, and employment
are varied and the effects on the economy as a whole analyzed. Special attention is
given to the effects on profits because the neo-Walrasian profit theory is known to
be deficient. In Section 4 the Walrasian regime is restated in structural axiomatic
terms and generalized. It is demonstrated, inter alia, how the pervasive deflationary
bias can be corrected. Section 5 concludes.
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1 Conceptual uniqueness
The effort toward rigor substitutes correct reasonings and results for
incorrect ones, but it offers other rewards too. It usually leads to a
deeper understanding of the problems to which it is applied, and this
has not failed to happen in the present case. (Debreu, 1959, p. x)
1.1 Axioms
The formal foundations of theoretical economics must be nonbehavioral and epito-
mize the interdependence of real and nominal variables that constitutes the monetary
economy. This is a cogent conclusion from the persistent collapse of behavioral and
real models.
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditure
in a period of arbitrary length. The period length is conveniently assumed to be
the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have for the beginning one world
economy, one firm, and one product. Axiomatization is about ascertaining the
minimum number of premises. Three suffice for the beginning.
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income, i.e.
the product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
If DN is set to zero then total income consists but of wage income.
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working hours.
O = RL |t (2)
The productivity R depends on the underlying production process. The 2nd axiom
should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function.
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P and
quantity bought X .
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment, no
foreign trade, and no government.
The economic content of the structural axioms is plain. The sole point to mention is
that total income in (1) is the sum of wage income and distributed profit and not of
wage income and profit. It is an imperative of rigorous analysis to keep profit and
distributed profit apart.
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1.2 Definitions
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms. With (4) wage
income YW and distributed profit YD is defined:
YW ≡WL YD ≡ DN |t. (4)
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical context
of concepts. New variables are introduced with new axioms.
We define the sales ratio as:
ρX ≡ XO |t. (5)
A sales ratio ρX = 1 indicates that the quantity sold X and the quantity produced O
are equal or, in other words, that the product market is cleared.
We define the expenditure ratio as:
ρE ≡ CY |t. (6)
An expenditure ratio ρE = 1 indicates that consumption expenditures C are equal to
total income Y , in other words, that the household sector’s budget is balanced.
2 Market clearing, budget balancing and other desiderata
Surely the greatest oddity in contemporary economics, granted that
‘Smith’s Problem’ is the central issue of economics, is the absence, more
than 200 years after the publication of Smith’s Wealth of Nations, of an
intellectually satisfying account of the modus operandi of the ‘invisible
hand’; so the question whether actual monetary exchange economics
are in some relevant sense self adjusting . . . not only remains to be
resolved, it has yet to be seriously addressed. (Clower and Howitt,
1997, p. 24), original emphasis
2.1 One firm
From (3), (5), and (6) follows the price as dependent variable:
P =
ρE
ρX
W
R
if YD = 0 |t. (7)
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Under the condition of market clearing and budget balancing follows:
P =
W
R
if YD = 0, ρX = 1, ρE = 1 |t.
(8)
The market clearing price is equal to unit wage costs if the expenditure ratio is unity.
In the case of budget balancing the profit per unit is therefore zero. All changes
of the wage rate and the productivity affect the market clearing price in the period
under consideration. Let us refer to this property as conditional price flexibility
because (8) involves no assumption about human behavior.
From (8) follows:
W
P
= R
if YD = 0, ρX = 1, ρE = 1 |t.
(9)
The real wage is equal to the productivity. This implies that the real wage is not
separately determined in the labor market. It has been derived in direct lineage from
the axiom set and the conditions of budget balancing and product market clearing.
This in turn implies that a variation of the wage rate can never affect the real wage
but only the market clearing price. In the simplest case the real wage is exactly equal
to the hourly product of a worker which is objectively determined by the production
process. Labor gets the whole product. It is immaterial whether the labor union
pushes the wage rate up or the firm pushes it down. The wage rate assumes the role
of the numéraire that co-determines all other nominal variables (Minsky, 2008, p.
58).
Since the real wage is given in any period independently of employment it cannot
possibly determine the level of employment. It is assumed for a start that the
economy operates at full employment L0. Total income is then given by:
Y =WL0 if YD = 0 |t. (10)
With this our elementary consumption economy is completely specified. It displays a
host of desirable properties (market clearing, budget balancing, conditional product
price flexibility, full employment) and is reproducible for an indefinite time span,
provided no external hindrances occur.
One desirable property of the elementary consumption economy is easy expand-
ability. If the available labor supply grows the firm hires additional workers at the
going wage rate. With more labor input output increases according to (2). On the
other hand income and consumption expenditures rise in step according to (10) and
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ρE = 1. Under the conditions of budget balancing and market clearing the price (8)
remains unchanged. Supply creates its own demand; Say’s Law holds because the
expenditure ratio and the sales ratio is unity.
Not to forget, any expansion requires a larger average stock of transaction money and
must be supported with ‘elastic currency’ by the central bank (for details see 2011b,
Sec. 3). The expansion happens at constant price if wage rate and productivity
either remain unaltered or change with the same rate.
In sum: The structural axioms and the conditions of market clearing and budget
balancing render the most elementary formal description of a reproducible consump-
tion economy that operates at any level of employment. Full employment growth
conjoined with price stability is possible under additional conditions.
2.2 Two firms
The axioms and definitions have first to be differentiated. Period income changes
from (1) to:
Y = WA︸︷︷︸
W
LA + WB︸︷︷︸
W
LB +DANA +DBNB︸ ︷︷ ︸
YD=0
|t. (11)
The full employment labor input is now allocated between two firms:
L0 ≡ LA +LB |t. (12)
Since distributed profits are set to zero in order to keep things simple for the
beginning and the wage rates of the two firms are assumed to be identical, total
income does not change with a reallocation of labor input between firms. Full
employment L0 is maintained by assumption. Only the composition of the business
sector’s output changes with a reallocation of labor input.
The partitioning of the consumption expenditures in period t is given by:
CA = PAXA
CB = PBXB.
(13)
For the relative prices of two products then follows directly from (13) in combination
with the differentiated sales ratio (5):
PA
PB
=
RB
RA
LB
LA
CA
CB
if ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t. (14)
If the markets for both products are cleared the relation of prices is inversely propor-
tional to the relation of productivities and the relation of labor inputs and directly
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proportional to the relation of consumption expenditures for the two products.
A straightforward result materializes if the labor inputs of the two firms stand in the
same proportion as the expenditures for both products:
PA
PB
=
RB
RA
if
LA
LB
=
CA
CB
=
ρEA
ρEB
and ρXA = 1, ρXB = 1 |t.
(15)
If labor input is allocated according to the consumers’ preferences, which are
revealed by their expenditure ratios, then relative prices are inversely proportional to
the productivities in the two lines of production. The productivities are measurable
in principle. Hence relative prices depend in the simplest case with equal wage rates
on the objective ratio of productivities. The subjective partitioning of consumption
expenditures has no effect on relative prices if it corresponds to the allocation of
labor input. We refer to this unique configuration of labor inputs and expenditure
ratios as the competitive structure.
We define the exchange ratio as quotient of market clearing prices and the transfor-
mation ratio as quotient of productivities:
ρP ≡ PAPB and ρR ≡
RA
RB
units of B
unit of A
←
C
unit of A
C
unit of B
and
units of A
unit of B
←
units of A
h
units of B
h
(16)
The exchange ratio is different from the price relation with regard to the dimension
but has the same numerical value. The exchange ratio is the real counterpart
of relative prices. In a strictly real analysis only exchange ratios are admissible.
Likewise for the transformation ratio. In real terms (15) boils down to:
ρP =
1
ρR
|t. (17)
In the competitive structure the real exchange ratio is inverse to the transformation
ratio. This is the most elementary form of the objective relation between exchange
and production. This real law of value is entirely free of subjective connotations.
From (15) in combination with (12) follows under the condition of budget balancing:
LA
L0−LA =
ρEA
1−ρEA ⇒ LA = ρEA L0
if ρEA +ρEB = 1 |t.
(18)
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The employment of firm A is determined by that part of total income that the
households spend on product A. Under the condition of full employment the labor
input of firm B is then also known.
The argument of the present section is not affected if LA (or LB) is split between
an arbitrary number of firms of different size, i.e. LA = LA1 +LA2 + . . .+LAn. The
only condition that must hold is that all firms have the same productivity. The
general case with different productivities has been dealt with elsewhere (2011c).
The arbitrary number of firms with equal productivity then constitutes the supply
side of market A.
The business sector’s financial profit in period t is defined with (19) as the difference
between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with consumption
expenditure C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW :1
Q f i ≡C−YW |t. (19)
Because of (3) and (4) this is identical with:
Q f i ≡ PX−WL |t. (20)
This form is well-known from the theory of the firm.
From (19) and (1) finally follows:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD |t. (21)
The three equations are formally equivalent and show profit under different per-
spectives. Eq. (21) tells us that overall profit is zero if ρE = 1 and YD = 0. It is
important to recall that we discuss until Section 4.3 the simplified case with zero
distributed profit. Hence profit for the business sector as a whole depends at the
moment solely on the relation of consumption expenditures and income, i.e. on the
expenditure ratio. Then, with an expenditure ratio of unity profit of the business
sector as a whole is zero.
For firm A eq. (20) reads in the case of market clearing:
Q f iA ≡ PARALA
(
1− WA
PARA
)
if ρXA = 1 |t. (22)
Financial profit of firm A is zero under the condition that the quotient of wage rate,
price, and productivity is unity. This holds independently of the level of employment
or the size of the firm. From the zero profit condition follows:
1 Nonfinancial profit is treated at length in (2012).
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PA =
WA
RA
|t. (23)
The price is equal to unit wage costs. In the same way we get the price PB. Taken
together, the zero profit condition – Walras’s ‘ni bénéfice ni perte’ – gives for
relative prices again (15) under the condition of equal wage rates:
PA
PB
=
WA
RA
WB
RB
=
W
RA
W
RB
=
RB
RA
⇒ ρP = 1ρR
if Q f iA = 0, Q f iB = 0, ρEA +ρEB = 1, WA =WB =W
(24)
In other words, in the competitive structure with employment in strict proportion
to the expenditure ratios profits of both firms are zero if the wage rates are equal.
The relation of prices is unequivocally determined by the inverse productivities
independently of the partitioning of the consumption expenditures. No matter how
the household sector distributes total income between the two products, the markets
are cleared, wage rates are equal and profits are zero.
Since we have from the standard theory of consumer demand the marginalistic
behavioral condition that the marginal rate of substitution MRS be equal to the
price ratio we are in the position to synthesize the structural formalism and the
marginalistic behavioral assumption. From the definition of the expenditure ratio
(6) in combination with (3) follows:
ρEA
ρEB
=
CA
Y
CB
Y
=
PAXA
PBXB
|t. (25)
When, by applying the rule MRS = PAPB , the optimal quantities XA, XB are determined
in the usual way as coordinates of the tangential point of budget constraint and indif-
ference map, then the optimal partitioning of consumption expenditures ρEA, ρEB
is also determined. This implies that any configuration of expenditure ratios can
be interpreted as a consumer optimum. In the competitive structure subjective
factors like the marginal rate of substitution or the underlying preferences play no
longer any role for relative prices because these are determined by the objective
productivities.
The task of the auctioneer in the elementary consumption economy is rather straight-
forward. At the beginning of period t he looks at the productivities and the wage
rate, calculates the prices according to (23) and makes them publicly known. The
households partition the total consumption expenditures, which are equal to the
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full employment income, and the business sector allocates the total labor input in
identical proportion. Since the marginal rate of substitution is a nonentity it can
always be said, but neither be proved nor disproved, that the competitive structure is
Pareto optimal. There is no point, therefore, in devoting much words to rationality
and optimality. The key question is how the partitioning of full employment labor
input can be brought in harmony with the arbitrary partitioning of consumption
expenditures between both lines of production. The auctioneer knows the solution
because he has the structural axiom set at the back of his mind, but he cannot
communicate it to the agents by telling them only the market clearing prices. In
order to determine the allocation of labor input the firms need, according to (18),
the respective expenditure ratios and the full employment input L0.
Since changes of the uniform wage rate make no difference in our simple consump-
tion economy they cannot be used as signal. With a flexible market clearing price
profit is zero with any wage rate at any level of employment. Thus the firm can
be perfectly indifferent between all employment levels. To break the impasse it
is necessary to introduce a behavioral assumption. Full employment can only be
achieved if the firm hires workers at the going wage rate as long as there is supply
available. In the case of a positive profit per unit this rule guarantees the biggest
absolute profit at the capacity limit. In the case of zero profit per unit, however, this
biggest absolute profit is zero.
3 Signals, interpretations, and the fingers of the invisible hand
It is correct, of course, to assert that coordination is performed by an
“invisible hand” or the “price system”, correct, to be sure, but just as
surely insane, because such a response is no better than an appeal to
Jupiter or Providence. An intellectually respectable answer should
consist of something more than tired clichés; observable economic
events derive ultimately not from unspecified coordinating mechanisms,
whether invisible hands, price systems, or neo-Walrasian “auctioneers”,
but . . . from definable actions of real people. What we economists
have yet to explain is the working of the fingers of the “invisible hand”.
(Clower, 1998, p. 410)
3.1 Change of preferences
Our point of departure is the initial period as described in Section 2.2 with the
competitive structure at full employment. It is assumed now that well before the
beginning of period1 the firms poll the households and learn that that the expenditure
ratio for the product of firm A, i.e. ρEA1, will be up and correspondingly ρEB1 will
be down, such that the overall expenditure ratio is still unity.
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The firms decide to adapt output accordingly and to maintain the competitive
structure. By consequence LA goes up and LB is reduced in strict proportion
to the expenditure ratios. There is no further change. Relative prices remain
unchanged since productivities stay where they are. Total income is not affected
by the reallocation of labor input and with an overall expenditure ratio of unity
total consumption expenditures are equal to those in the initial period. A change
of preferences does not affect the product prices, only the allocation of labor input.
Relative prices play no role for the reallocation. What the firms really need is
accurate prior information about shifts of the expenditure ratios. Then the respective
labor inputs can be calculated with (18) under the premise that total full employment
input is known. The adaptation of the labor inputs implies that the workers are, with
equal wage rates, indifferent between the firms and move freely between them. This,
of course, is an idealization that helps to focus here on the question of price–quantity
adaptations of output. The separate effects of wage rate changes are discussed in
Section 3.4. Since the wage rates are here uniform they cannot assume the role of a
signal. The workers must take their clue from another signal.
As an alternative scenario imagine now that the firms learn about the demand shift
as before but cannot change the allocation of labor input immediately. The structure
in period1 is no longer competitive. In order to clear the product market the firms
adapt the prices. From (3) in combination with (5), (6), and (11) follows for the
general case:
PA = ρEA
WA
RA
(
1+
WB
WA
(
L0
LA
−1
))
if ρXA = 1, YD = 0 |t.
(26)
The price of product A depends under the condition of market clearing on demand,
expressed by the expenditure ratio, unit wage costs and the structure of wage costs
in both firms. Mutatis mutandis for firm B. If wage rates are equal in both firms
(26) reduces to:
PA = ρEA
W
RA
L0
LA
if ρXA = 1, YD = 0, WA =WB =W |t.
(27)
It holds that PA1 > PA0 because ρEA1 > ρEA0 with unchanged production conditions.
Correspondingly, the market clearing price of firm B falls. Thus, relative prices are
no longer in inverse proportion with the unaltered productivities as in (15).
The profit of firm A is now greater than zero because the price is higher while wage
costs do not change. As a mirror image firm B makes a loss of equal magnitude.
Total profit of the business sector is zero as it was in the initial period. This is a
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situation than cannot last for long. With continuing losses firm B drops eventually
out and the structure of the business sector changes. Product B vanishes and
employment may fall below full employment. The adaptation of prices clears the
markets but disturbs the initial equality of zero profits. Logically this implies that
one firm may get lost in the process. This aspect of price adaptation is usually
overlooked.
The only action that leads to a stable outcome is known. It consists of the reallocation
of labor input. An appropriate increase of LA in (27) counteracts the increase of
the expenditure ratio and leaves the price at the former level. The move of labor
input from firm B to A is in accordance with the profit situation, however, firm A is
not forced in any way to increase employment. In stark contrast, firm B is under
pressure to reduce employment. It is assumed here that labor takes vacancies as
signal and moves smoothly at equal and constant wage rates from firm B to A. There
is no point, obviously, in watching price signals. The final result is the same as it was
without the detour of price changes except for the redistribution of money between
the firms that takes the form of profit and loss (for details about the monetary side
see 2011b).
In sum: If the households’ preferences between the products A and B change then
a purely quantitative adaptation of labor input is sufficient. All prices and the
wage rate can be held constant. An adaption of product prices to demand shifts
destabilizes the economy and has strong distributive side effects. To answer a shift
of preferences the quantity mechanism is needed instead of the price mechanism.
3.2 Change of productivity
Our point of departure is again the initial period with the competitive structure
at full employment. It is assumed now that firm A knows at the beginning of
period1 that the productivity increases, i.e. that RA1 > RA0. In order to maintain
the competitive structure relative prices should therefore change according to (15).
In the simplest case firm A reduces the price and everything else is left unchanged.
The lower market clearing price follows from (23). At this price the additional
output is, as a first step, fully absorbed by the household sector with unchanged
consumption expenditures. The lower price is not only a signal but de facto enables
the households to buy the increased quantity. In other words, with unchanged total
nominal income (11) real income increases. For deflationary effects on the price
level and advisable counter measures see Section 4.2.
The simple price/quantity adaptation, which fits the accustomed idea of supply up
– price down, changes the relation of consumption goods and may give rise to a
second round adaptation. The new relation of quantities bought, which indicates a
quantitative improvement, is given by:
XA1
XB0
>
XA0
XB0
. (28)
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The households, though, may wish to return to the previous relation:
XA2
XB2
=
XA0
XB0
. (29)
In order to restore the initial relation in period2 the expenditure ratio for product
A has to be lowered and that for product B has to be increased. This demand shift
leaves relative prices (15) unchanged.
From (25) follows in combination with (15) under the condition that the relation of
quantities XA and XB remains constant:
ρEA
ρEB
= ρκ
RB
RA
|t. (30)
With a constant ratio ρκ of the quantities bought and consumed the expenditure
ratio ρEA decreases if the productivity RA increases. As a consequence labor input
is reallocated from firm A to B and the households buy in the second round more
of product B and less of A. This restoration of the initial relation of the quantities
bought happens at constant prices. In the final analysis the productivity push in firm
A increases the quantities bought and consumed of both products.
The properties of the competitive structure suggest that a price reduction is the
correct first round answer to a productivity increase. The firm, however, has no
idea of the systemic interrelations and may decide to sell the same quantity at the
same price as before and to reduce labor input thus causing a small version of
technological unemployment. If the firm sees the market price as fixed this reaction
is not improbable. After all, the idea to lower employment in order to increase
profit is rather commonplace. If the firm succeeds total income diminishes and with
constant expenditure ratios consumption expenditures in both lines of production
diminish thus causing a loss in firm B that is exactly equal to the profit in firm A.
This is not stable situation in the longer run.
In sum: Since no firm, however small, is a price taker but fixes its selling price
autonomously (with an eye to overall market conditions) the enlightened price setter
takes a productivity increase as a signal to reduce the price. The myopic price setter
tries to increase profit by reducing labor input thus causing trouble in the rest of the
economy. It is quite improbable that the myopic price setter interprets this trouble
as a signal to change his behavior. He interprets, rather, his rising profit as a signal
to continue with the reduction of labor input, thus aggravating the situation.
3.3 Change of the employment level
Our point of departure is again the initial period with the competitive structure at
full employment. Now the overall supply of labor increases and the full employment
level reaches a new height, i.e. L1 > L0.
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It is assumed first that both firms act in accordance with (18), that is, both increase
labor input at the going wage rate in proportion to the given expenditure ratios. This
presupposes that the firms know at the beginning of period1 the exact amount of
the new full employment labor input L1 and the respective expenditure ratios. It
would be the wrong course of action to reduce the uniform wage rate because this
would, as we know from Section 2.1, only translate into a fall of the market clearing
prices. For the labor market as a whole the accustomed idea of supply up – wage
rate down is inapplicable, because of the interdependence with the product market
as a whole. The interdependence is established by the balanced budget condition
which is expressed by an overall expenditure ratio of unity.
Total income increases as both firms move in step by applying (18) and increase
labor input to LA1, respectively LB1. Output grows in both firms according to
(2). The relation of expenditures, expressed by the respective expenditure ratios,
remains the same. Absolute prices stay where they are and the price relation (15)
remains unchanged. With a constant wage rate a proportional increase of supply
creates proportional demand in both lines of production. Under the proportionality
condition Say’s Law holds in an economy with an arbitrary number of firms and
markets. It nearly goes without saying that the employment expansion requires a
larger average stock of transaction money (for details see 2011b, Sec. 3). Otherwise,
the monetary side becomes a hindrance to growth.
If the newly hired workers display a different expenditure pattern the expenditure
ratios change and by consequence the allocation of labor input between the firm must
change in order to maintain the competitive structure. This case can be analytically
decomposed into a proportional increase of labor input and a change of preferences
as discussed in Section 3.1.
If the total increase of labor supply, i.e. ∆L1 = L1−L0, is fully allocated to firm B
then costs increase by W∆L1. However, consumption expenditures increase only by
the fraction ρEB of this amount. Starting from the zero profit situation in the initial
period this reduces profit by:
∆Q f iB1 =W∆L1 (ρEB−1) (31)
and leaves firm B with a loss. Firm A’s labor input and costs remain unchanged
but because of the increased total income the market clearing price rises with
consumption expenditures CA. The resulting profit is equal to firm B’s loss. This is
an untenable situation in the longer run. The solution is known: employment has
to move from B to A until the proportionality of the competitive structure is again
established.
A Schumpeterian entrepreneur disturbs the competitive structure if the expenditure
ratio for his product is disproportionate compared to his labor input. His profit, and
the losses in the rest of the economy, vanishes with an increase of labor input.
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3.4 Differentiation of the wage rate
Our point of departure is again the initial period with the competitive structure at
full employment and an equal wage rate W in both firms. It is assumed now that
firm A increases the wage rate at the beginning of period1 and firm B reduces it,
such that total income (11) remains unchanged.
The consequences are obvious. Firm A makes a loss and B a profit of equal
magnitude. All other things remain unchanged. Again the situation is untenable.
The remedy consists in a reduction of labor input in firm A and an expansion in B.
This brings us to the general conditions of the competitive structure with different
wage rates.
4 Generalizations
Wherever entrepreneurs make profits (beyond the market return on
their own land, labor, and capital) they expand production; wherever
they incur losses, production is contracted. In equilibrium therefore,
there are neither profits nor losses. Walras thus created the abstraction
of the zero-profit entrepreneur under perfect competition. (Niehans,
1994, p. 214)
4.1 The Walrasian regime in structural axiomatic terms
Equal wage rates is the most convenient assumption to start with. Reality strongly
suggests to abandon this simplification first. Hence the 1st axiom reads now:
Y =WALA +WBLB +DANA +DBNB︸ ︷︷ ︸
YD=0
|t. (32)
We do not stop for an explanation but take it as simple fact that the wage rate
is higher in one line of production than in the other. The wage rate is, more
precisely, an average that is compatible with extremely different distributions of
wage rates among individual workers (the generic term workers includes all levels
of management). For the world outside the firm this makes no difference if the
expenditure ratios of all workers are equal. This is assumed for the moment.
The wage differentiation splits the labor market. At least one characteristic must
be different between the workers in firm A and B. Since the working hours LA and
LB are now qualitatively different they cannot, in the strict sense, be added up to
overall employment. The perfectly free movement of labor between the two lines
of production is no longer possible. Hence full employment has now to be defined
separately for each line of production. The more we differentiate the occupations
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and levels the more occasions for mismatches arise. With progressive differentiation
the notion of overall full employment gets progressively out of sight.
It is assumed that the expenditure ratios are given and independent of the level of
total income. Whether each agent realizes his utility maximum or not is an empty
question because utility is a nonentity. From (3) and (6) then follows the market
clearing price of product A:
PA =
ρEA
RA
(
WA +WB
LB
LA
)
if ρXA = 1 |t.
(33)
In can be said that product A’s price depends on demand expressed by the expendi-
ture ratio and supply expressed by the production- and cost conditions in firms A
and B. It has to be emphasized that (33) gives a numerical answer to the question of
the market clearing price while crossing demand and supply schedules never did
and never will. The price of product A depends also on the cost situation in firm B.
It would be illegitimate to assume away this interdependence with the Marshallian
ceteris paribus.
The market clearing price is inserted into the profit equation (20):
Q f iA ≡WALA (1−ρEA)+ρEAWBLB
if ρXA = 1 |t.
(34)
Under the condition of market clearing profit depends on total wage income and the
expenditure ratio for product A. Profit does not depend, for example, on productivity
or monopoly power or exploitation. Under the additional conditions of zero profit
and budget balancing (34) yields:
ρEBWALA = ρEAWBLB
if ρXA = 1, Q f iA = 0, ρEA +ρEB = 1 |t.
(35)
From the market clearing price of firm B, i.e. from
PB =
ρEB
RB
(
WB +WA
LA
LB
)
if ρXB = 1,
(36)
follows under the condition of zero profit and budget balancing again (35).
From (35) in turn the general rule of allocation can be derived as:
16
ρEA
ρEB
=
WALA
WBLB
if ρXA = 1, Q f iA = 0, ρXB = 1, Q f iB = 0, ρEA +ρEB = 1 |t.
(37)
The competitive structure is established if weighted labor input is allocated in
the same proportion as the expenditure ratios. Hence, given the expenditure ratio
ρEA, a higher wage rate corresponds to a lower labor input in the respective line
of production. For equal wage rates (37) reduces to the already known rule of
straightforward proportionality of expenditure ratios and labor input as stated with
(15). With regard to firm A (37) says explicitly:
LA =
1
1
ρEA
−1
WB
WA
LB
if ρXA = 1, Q f iA = 0, ρXB = 1, Q f iB = 0, ρEA +ρEB = 1 |t.
(38)
Given the expenditure ratio ρEA and employment in firm B, employment in firm
A varies with relative wage rates. An increase of the relative wage rate of firm A
corresponds to a lower labor input. In order to determine the labor input in firm A it
is assumed that LB and WB is known. The wage rate of firm B assumes in this case
the role of the nominal numéraire. Then it is sufficient to determine the wage rate
WA such that full employment in this line of production is established.
Mutatis mutandis for firm B:
LB =
1
1
ρEB
−1
WA
WB
LA
if ρXA = 1, Q f iA = 0, ρXB = 1, Q f iB = 0, ρEA +ρEB = 1 |t.
(39)
Note that labor input LB does not change at all if a lower wage rate WA is exactly
compensated by a higher employment LA, such that the product of both variables
remains constant. We refer to this special case as hyperbolic variation. An alternative
characterization would be to say that the elasticity of employment with regard to
the wage rate is unity.
Equations (38) and (39) are mutually compatible under the condition of budget
balancing.
Relative prices follow from (33) and (36):
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PA
PB
=
ρEA
ρEB
RB
RA
LB
LA
if ρXA = 1, Q f iA = 0, ρXB = 1, Q f iB = 0, ρEA +ρEB = 1 |t.
(40)
Now we substitute the general condition for the competitive structure (37) and this
finally gives:
PA
PB
=
WA
RA
WB
RB
if ρXA = 1, Q f iA = 0, ρXB = 1, Q f iB = 0, ρEA +ρEB = 1 |t.
(41)
In the competitive structure the relation of market clearing prices is equal to the
relation of unit wage costs. With equal wage rates this reduces to (15) and ultimately
to (17).
To put the formalism to work imagine a scenario with initial full employment in both
lines of production followed by an increase of labor supply LB. The expenditure
ratios remain fix. According to the accustomed idea of the price mechanism the
wage rate is bid down. The fall of WB and the increase of employment LB in
(38) is here hyperbolic, that is, their product remains constant. By consequence
LA remains unchanged. Hence, total income remains unchanged too. However,
with a falling wage rate and increasing employment LB and output OB on the one
hand, the market clearing price PB on the other hand must fall. Since the price
PA remains unaffected the price level, measured as a weighted average of both
prices, declines. With increasing employment in firm B the composition of output
changes. In the first round of adaptation the households buy more of product B.
The previous composition can be reestablished in a separate step with a change of
expenditure ratios as described in Section 3.1. Note that our scenario follows the
logic of the competitive structure. Behavioral assumptions like ‘maximization of
an utility indicator’ (Ingrao and Israel, 1990, p. 297) are not applied. In particular
the assumption of profit maximization is not applied. These conceptions cannot be
justified (for an alternative formalization of human behavior see 2011a).
The generality of the structural axioms enables a reconstruction of the Walrasian
regime as special case. The well-known characteristics are present: market clearing,
budget balancing, zero profit, full employment in both lines of production, and
optimal partitioning of the expenditures between product A and B. It is important
to emphasize, though, that an analog to unit wage costs cannot be formulated in
real terms, that is, eq. (41) cannot be expressed in a Walrasian context. Or, put
otherwise, a consistent Walrasian regime works on the implicit assumption of equal
wage rates because only in this case (41) reduces to (17) which expresses a relation
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of real magnitudes. The Walrasian approach cannot, according to its own rules,
admit nominal or monetary magnitudes.
. . . the prerequisite for the elaboration of the theory of value is the
exclusion of the nominal form in which economic magnitudes occur,
and beyond that, the elimination of all monetary magnitudes. (Benetti
and Cartelier, 1997, p. 207)
This is the main difference in comparison to the structural axiomatic approach which
has built the interaction of real and nominal magnitudes into the formal foundations.
The quantity of money follows directly from the axiom set (for details see 2011b).
In marked contrast there is no proper place for money in the Walrasian regime. The
auxiliary role of money is restricted to the determination of the price level. In the
structural axiomatic approach the quantity of money is not among the determinants
of the market clearing price.
4.2 Price level stability
Price level stability is an additional desideratum. In the Walrasian regime this is
achieved by holding the quantity of money, respectively its growth rate, stable. The
mechanism in the structural axiomatic regime is quite different.
From the simplest possible case of Section 2.1 we know that the market clearing
price is determined by the wage rate and the productivity. In Section 4.1 we have
found that an employment expansion in one line of production is accompanied by a
fall of the wage rate and of the market clearing price. Since the price level for our
simple economy is defined as weighted average of the market clearing prices in the
two lines of production, i.e. as
P≡ PAΘA +PBΘB
with ΘA +ΘB = 1
(42)
the price level declines with a fall of PB. This is not a desirable outcome if one holds
that price stability is preferable to both inflation and deflation.
In eq. (39) labor input LB depends on the relation of wage rates in the two lines
of production. The commonplace idea is that the wage rate WB must fall in order
to increase employment LB. This move is correct as a first step. With correct is
meant that the variation of relative wage rates is in accordance with the competitive
structure. This, though, is not the end of the story if we also want price stability.
In order to keep the price level constant a compensating wage increase that leaves
relative wage rates undisturbed is required. That is, in a second round the wage
rates in both lines of production have to be increased. According to (41) relative
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prices are not affected by a proportional wage rate increase. The net result of the
two steps is that the wage rate WA rises bit and WB falls a bit, but less so than at
the first step. Needless to emphasize that the myopic decision makers in firm A do
not see any necessity for wage rate increases in order to counteract the deflationary
bias that is inherent in the employment adaptation of firm B. As we have seen in
Section 3.2, this bias is amplified by productivity increases. What is required in a
Walrasian regime, then, is an enlightened wage setter. The quantity of money has no
direct impact on the price level (for details see 2011b), but the wage rate has. All in
all, as a guide to economic policy the Walrasian regime and the attendant quantity
theory can neither be taken seriously as a simplified theoretical description of the
elementary interdependencies nor as an ideal. Price signals and price taking agents
are not sufficient to keep the economy in a reproducible state. Moreover, the price
taker is a nonentity.
4.3 Profit and profit distribution
We finally have to allow for positive profit and profit distribution. The 1st axiom
now takes the general form:
Y =WALA +WBLB +DANA +DBNB︸ ︷︷ ︸
YD>0
|t. (43)
From the profit definition (19) in combination with (6) follows:
Q f iA ≡ ρEA (WALA +WBLB +YD)−WALA. |t. (44)
Profit in firm A depends on the expenditure ratio, the wage costs in both firms and
the total amount of distributed profits. The formula for firm B is analogous.
For a comparison between firms of different size the profit ratio is needed. It is
defined as:
ρQA ≡ Q f iAWALA |t. (45)
The profit ratio, which is different from the profit rate, is the quotient of absolute
profit and costs. It carries no dimension.
We now introduce the additional condition that the profit ratios are equal in all lines
of production. Therefrom follows:
ρQA = ρQB ⇒ ρEAρEB =
WALA
WBLB
(46)
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Again we get the condition of the competitive structure (37), i.e. weighted labor
input in the two lines of production stands in the same relation as the respective
expenditure ratios. That is to say, that the zero profit condition is only a limiting
case of equal profit ratios. In the general case budget balancing, i.e. ρEA +ρEB = 1,
is not required. In the competitive structure holds for the price relation (41), that is,
the market clearing prices are proportional to unit wage costs. Absolute prices are,
of course, higher with distributed profits than without them.
With distributed profits greater than zero disturbances of the competitive structure
do no longer result in a profit in one line of production and a loss in the other but in a
higher or lower profit ratio. Profit in both lines are greater that zero. This, of course,
stabilizes the economy. A firm can survive for an indefinite time with a small profit
but not with a loss. Without profit buffers, which are created by profit distribution,
the zero profit economy displays the highest possible degree of instability.
What is needed in a general Walrasian regime is not only a mechanism for overall
market clearing but also a mechanism for overall profit ratio equalization. This is
a theoretical requirement. Under the zero profit condition this point is implicitly
answered: if all profits are zero, all profit ratios are equal. We do not know whether
profit ratios in fact tend to equalize in the real world but we can be absolutely
sure that the zero profit configuration has no counterpart wherever. Apart from
the question of profit ratio equalization one crucial point is that the neo-Walrasian
profit theory is indefensible (for details see 2013a). This, however, is not to say that
Post-Keynesianism is any better in this regard (for details see 2013b).
The original Walrasian attempt consisted in a sheer multiplication of the one-
fits-all basic idea of demand function–supply function–equilibrium. All three
elements are nonentities. How this hapless construction could ever find support
among economists is as great a puzzle as how epicycles could find support among
astronomers for more than thousand years. Whether economists can get out faster
of the protoscientific stage remains to be seen.
5 Conclusion
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. In the present paper assumptions like
maximization of an utility indicator are not applied. In particular the assumption of
profit maximization is not applied. These conceptions cannot be justified. Therefore,
three non-behavioral axioms constitute the formal groundwork for the reconstruction
and generalization of a Walrasian economy. The main results of the analysis are:
• The structural axioms and the conditions of market clearing and budget
balancing render the most elementary formal description of a reproducible
consumption economy that operates at any level of employment.
21
• In the competitive structure subjective factors like the marginal rate of substi-
tution or the underlying preferences play no longer any role for relative prices
because these are determined by the objective productivities.
• In the competitive structure the real exchange ratio is inverse to the transfor-
mation ratio.
• If the households’ preferences between the products A and B change then a
purely quantitative adaptation of labor input is sufficient. All prices and the
wage rate can be held constant. An adaption of product prices to demand
shifts destabilizes the economy and has strong distributive side effects. To
answer a shift of preferences the quantity mechanism is needed instead of the
price mechanism.
• Since no firm is a price taker but fixes its selling price autonomously (with
an eye to overall market conditions) the enlightened price setter takes a
productivity increase as a signal to reduce the price. The myopic price setter
tries to increase profit by reducing labor input thus causing trouble in the rest
of the economy.
• What is required in a Walrasian regime is an enlightened wage setter to
counteract the pervasive deflationary bias.
• The generality of the structural axioms enables a reconstruction of the Wal-
rasian regime as special case. The well-known characteristics are present:
market clearing, budget balancing, zero profit, full employment in both lines
of production, and optimal partitioning of the expenditures between products.
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